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LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN THE AGE OF
LEGISLATION
Elizabeth Garrettt
"We live in an age of legislation," observes Justice Antonin Scalia, and most new
law is statutory law.... Every issue of law resolved by a federal judge involves
interpretation of text - the text of a regulation, or of a statute, or of the Constitu-
tion.... By far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is to interpret
the meaning of federal statutes and federal agency regulations.'
Notwithstanding the importance of the legislative process to complete,
sophisticated legal analysis, the legal academy focuses very little of its attention on
Congress and state legislatures.2 Moreover, despite the publication of a number of
excellent casebooks on the legislative process,3 few schools offer students the
opportunity to study the legislative process other than as part of a substantive course
in an area of statutory law.4 Even the Legal Process materials, which continue to
influence the study of institutions and statutory interpretation, evince little interest in
the actual dynamics of lawmaking.5 Similarly, Judge Edwards' critique of legal
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1. AmromrN SCAUA, AMATiEROF pRErAION: FEERALCouRts ANvIm LAw 13-14(1997).
2. See Jeremy Waldron, Dirty Little Secret, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 510, 518 (1998) (reviewing ROBERiO
MA BGmA UNGEmWHATSHOUDL.GALANALiSLSBsromE? (1996) and discussing Unger's critique of the academic
preoccupation with courts rather than political institutions).
3. See, e.g., WMnAAMN.EsKMGEJR. &PHLP.FRICKEmY, CAsES ANDMATERALSONLEGISLATION: STAluiES
AND UM CREATION OF PUBLIC POuICY (2d ed. 1998); ABNER J. MIKVA & ERic LANE, LaGiSLATVE PROCESS (1995);
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF Er AL., THE LAw OF DastOCRAcy: LEGAL STRUcRa OF vim POLrTCAL PROCESS (1998);
WaUAM D. POPKiN, MAmItmALS ON LEGISLATION: POLTCAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS (2d ed. 1997)
4. See Deborah Jones Merritt & Jennifer Cihon, New Course Offering in the Upper-Level Curriculum: Report
of an AALS Survey, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524, 563-564 (1997) (noting that between 1994 and 1997, "law schools [in
the survey of over eighty schools] initiated only 9 new courses on legislation, statutory interpretation, or the legislative
process. Only 3 of these courses drew upon the tenure-track faculty.").
5. See, e.g., HENRYM.HARTJR.&ALBERTM.SACKSTHELEGALPRocEss: BASIcPRoBLEzSINumMAKNGAND
AICATIONOFLAW 164 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994):
The legislature has a primary, first-line responsibility to establish the institutions necessary or
appropriate in the everyday operation of government.... But in relation to the body of general
directive arrangements which govern private activity in the society its responsibility is more
accurately described as secondary in the sense of second-line. The legislature characteristically
functions in thisrelation as an intermittently intervening, trouble-shooting, back-stopping agency.
See also text accompanying notes 21-22 (discussing the legal process approach to statutory interpretation); ROBEMM
MANGABERAUNGER, WHATSHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BEcoME? 107 (1996) (arguing that the legal process scholars
relegated the legislature "to a residual statue, a last-ditch instrument to be used when the powers of rational deliberation
679
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scholarship, the source for the topic of this symposium, virtually ignores legislators
and regulators as consumers of legal scholarship and teaching. He devotes only one
page of his original article to discussing the kind of scholarship that might be most
helpful to legislators.6 He mentions lawmakers and regulators in passing in one of his
"postscripts" on this topic.7 His brief treatment of the issue gives the reader no
concrete sense of the kind of scholarship that he believes would benefit policynakers
and lawyers working with statutes and regulations.
In this essay, I hope to suggest some questions for legal scholars to explore that
would expand our understanding of the legal system in this age of legislation. Given
the occasion of this symposium, to honor Professor Bernard Schwartz whose work
in constitutional law continues to inform the legal profession, I will focus on the
intersection between constitutional law and statutory interpretation. Constitutional
principles are relevant to statutory interpretation in at least two ways. First, methods
of interpretation are often defended on separation-of-powers grounds and thus relate
to the Constitution's division of authority among the branches.8 Textualists, for
example, claim that constitutional considerations affect the legitimacy of extrinsic
sources of meaning used to decode statutory text.9 Second, courts use some
substantive canons of construction, particularly requirements of clear statements, to
protect constitutional norms that they may be unwilling to protect in a more
aggressive fashion by striking down the law.10 These canons are not only the method
by which the judiciary chooses to resolve some constitutional challenges; they also
allocate among the branches the primary responsibility for enforcing the
Constitution." For example, Cass Sunstein justifies nondelegation as a canon of
construction because it allows courts to signal "Congress that any intrusion will have
fail").
6. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
Mi- L.REV. 34,55 (1992) (arguing that although they may benefit more thanjudges from "theoretical, prescriptive"
scholarship, legislators also need what Edwards terms "practical" scholarship). See also Richard A. Posner, The
Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MiC. L REV. 1921, 1926 (1993) (noting Edwards'
silence "on the growing literature informed by philosophy and literary theory, on the interpretation of constitutions and
statutes, even though interpretation is the major function of the court on which Judge Edwards sits").
7. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A
Postscript, 91 Mica. L. REv. 2191, 2207 (1993) (quoting a letter from a lawyer with a lobbying practice for the
proposition that "practical" scholarship would be helpful to regulators and legislators). I found no discussion of
legislators or regulators in Harry T. Edwards, Another "Postscript" to "The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession", 69 WAsH. L. REV. 561 (1994) [hereinafter, Another Postscript].
8. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHL L. REv. (forthcoming
1999).
9. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 25 (using rule of law concerns and the separation of powers as justifications
for textualism); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLt. L. REV. 673 (1997)
(explaining the textualist's decision to eschew reliance on legislative history as compelled by the bicameralism and
presentment requirements).
10. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. RPv. 593, 598 (1992) [hereinafter Eskridge and Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law].
11. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAMn. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992) [hereinaifter Eskridge and Frickey, Quasi.
Constitutional Law].
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to be supported by a focused legislative judgment."12
As these justifications reveal, much of our constitutional and statutory
structure is designed to influence the behavior of policymakers and citizens, and thus
it involves predicting reactions to particular incentives. Accurate predictions rely on
observations of past behavior and current capacities. More generally, those searching
for ways to implement constitutional values effectively through methods of statutory
interpretation or otherwise must develop realistic assessments of the institutions that
play a role in such implementation. 3 Accordingly, legal scholarship in this area of
legislative process and constitutional law must be grounded more firmly in empirical
study and testing than it has been so far. Empiricism- or the use of knowledge based
on observation and practical experience - should play a role in any effort to develop
and test workable institutional structures and interpretive approaches.' 4 This essay
will suggest some promising avenues for empirical work, particularly through
interdisciplinary scholarship that draws on the insights of political science, political
philosophy, and economics, as well as on traditional doctrinal analysis. 5
I
When judges select an interpretive method or canon of construction to use in a
particular case, they make assumptions - often not articulated explicitly - about the
legislative process. For example, judges may choose a rule of construction because
they believe that it accurately accounts for the way legislators behave. Many of the
linguistic canons - e.g., expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the canon against
12. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 88 (1996). See, e.g.,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (using the canon to protect values of
nondelegation doctrine).
13. See Richard H. Fallon, Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 11 HARV.L.REv.54,57 (1997) (arguing
that "identifying the 'meaning' of the Constitution is not the Court's only function. A crucial mission of the Court is
to implement the Constitution successfully") (emphasis added); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory,
73 N.Y.U. L REV. 1,11 (1998) (advocating a shift in constitutional theorizing so that scholars focus on the "task of
exploring the operation and consequences of constitutionalism").
14. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use ofAuthority in Statutory Interpretation: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 70
TEX L REV. 1073 (1992) (analyzing 413 Supreme Court cases with issues of statutory interpretation to determine the
sources of authority used in decisions). On the basis of his empirical work, Professor Zeppos concluded that dynamic
theories of interpretation best described Supreme Court practice, in particular, the theory of practical reasoning
developed by Professors Eskridge and Frickey. See id. at 1115 (referring to William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. LREv. 321 (1990)). In addition to this relatively
systematicwork, empirical studies can be more casual in nature, based on discussions with relevant actors, close studies
of particular cases or laws, and experience in the decisionmaking environment. See, e.g., James J. Brudney,
Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH.
L. REa. 1 (1994); Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995,45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1113 (1997).
15. See George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of the
Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 1929, 1933 (1993):
To the extent that it is important to understand the legal system as one of society's political
institutions, it is important to invoke broader learning about politics and political institutions, for
example, with the study of political science. Again, a focus on legal doctrine alone will be
insu ficient since legal doctrine, on its face, is unlikely to reveal political influence or consequence.
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surplusage, ejusdem generis - are justified on the ground that they capture the
enactor's linguistic understandings. They are analogous to default rules in contract
law that are designed to mimic the practices and intentions of the parties. 6 If the
reality of lawmaking diverges from the theories of lawmaking that support these
canons, their use seems questionable and unjustified.17 Such canons should closely
match the behavior and linguistic conventions of lawmakers.
Other methods of statutoryinterpretation and substantive canons of construction
that relate to constitutional norms similarly rely on assumptions about the legislative
process. Methods of statutory interpretation that have constitutional aspects can be
divided into two types on the basis of their emphasis. First, some theorists focus on
the constitutional role of the courts in perfecting flawed legislative output. Second,
other theorists do not employ interpretive strategies primarily to improve particular
examples of legislative output; instead, they seek to improve the legislative process
itself in the hope that better structures of decisionmaking will result in laws that
judges do not have to fix."s I will focus primarily on this second group of theories -
which include textualism and some clear statement rules - but let me first address the
need for legal scholars to examine critically the approaches taken by the first group.
A
Interpreters in the first group see judicial interpretation of statutes primarily
as a mechanism to improve or perfect the laws, which may not represent wise policies
because of failures in the political process. They argue that judges should work to
devise interpretive strategies that will ameliorate the effects of such failures. For
example, those who believe that most legislation represents the outcome of inefficient
rent-seeking by special interest groups might adopt interpretive approaches designed
to minimize the economic losses caused by such activity or to broaden the scope of
the legislation so that more share in the federal benefits.'9 Others argue that certain
groups in society are systematically denied access to the political process, or
inevitably lack clout in the legislature, and they advocate interpreting statutes in ways
16. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALEL.J. 87, 97-100 (1989); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107
YALEL.J. 529,555-57 (1997) (drawing the analogybetween rules ofstatutory construction and default rules in contract
law) [hereafter Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Forum]; Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol
Evidence Rule and Its Implicationsfor New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEo. LJ. 195,221,230 (1998)
(using the analogy in analyzing the role of legislative history in statutory interpretation).
17. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation -In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cu!.L
REV. 800, 810-813 (1983) (attacking some of the linguistic canons because they rest on unrealistic assumptions of
congressional omniscience).
18. The line between the two kinds of theorists is not always distinct; some who focus primarily on improving the
legislative output, regardless of the process used to enact it, also hope to improve the legislative process in the future.
See infra footnotes 23 and 24.
19. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 533 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLU.
L.REV. 223(1986); seealsoEiner R.ElhaugeDoesInterest Group TheloryJustifyMore Intrusive JudicialReview?,
101 YALELJ. 31 (1991) (critiquing such approaches based on notions of pernicious interest group activity).
[Vol. 34:679
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that will empower such groups.20
The legal process approach to statutory interpretation, where interpreters
assume that legislation is the product of "reasonable persons pursuing reasonable
purposes reasonably 21 may be best understood as an attempt to construct a view of
the legislature that allows courts to improve the laws. Rather than seeing legal
process scholars as naively optimistic about legislatures, one should view them as
self-consciously using a particular description of a idealized legislative process to
produce interpretations that can better serve the public interest. 2 Or, as Ronald
Dworkin puts it in his theory of "law as integrity," judges should read statutes "in
whatever way follows from the best interpretation of the legislative process as a
whole."' Some of these theorists do not specifically argue that the legislative process
is flawed, nor do they always identify particular failures of the process. The tone of
their discussion of legislatures, however, is not one of empiricists, nor of people
convinced that the description they offer accurately portrays the dynamics that
characterize Capitol Hill.24
At first, this kind of interpretation seems unconcerned with any empirical
inquiry. If a legal process scholar is inventing an idealized legislature, why does he
need to concern himself with the details of the actual legislative process?' If a judge
conversant with public choice theory suspects that rent-seeking pervades the
legislative process, why must she confirm that intuition before embarking on a
strategy to infuse public-regarding perspectives into statutory interpretation?' If she
is wrong in her assumptions about the real world, she might nonetheless believe that
20. See JoHN HARTELYDaEocRAcYANDDISmTusT 101-04 (1980); see also Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy:
The Changing Structure ofLegitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARv.L. REv. 593, 618 (1995) (terming such
approaches ones that attemptto reconstructthepolitical process so that the effects of failures are mitigated) [hereinafter
Schachter, Metademocracy].
21. HART& SACKS, supra note 5, at 1378. Other approaches that are similar to the legal process school in their
use of interpretation to improve the legislative product include Professor Eskridge's dynamic interpretation, see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STAIrIORY ImERPrATION (1994) [hereinafter ESKmGE, DYNAMIC STAIUfORY
I~maRPMrATON], and Ronald Dworkin's cooperative venture between the legislature and the judge to yield the best
answer, see RONALD DWORKU, LAWS EMPIRE (1986).
22. See Peter Strauss, Legal Process and Judges in the Real World, 12 CARDOOL. REV. 1653,1659-60 (1991)
("Hart and Sacks were not naive enough to think they were describing an actual legislature; they wereprescribing an
attitude toward legislationthatwouldbe appropriateforajudge, despitethe contrary reality such sophisticated observers
knew even a half-hearted observer would quickly discover."). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey,
supra note 14, at 334 ("Whether Hart and Sacks thought this assumption [of reasonableness] reflected the realities of
the legislative process is unclear. ... []t appears that at least some of the legitimacy of their approach depends upon
the empirical accuracy of these assumptions.").
23. DwoRKN, supra note 21, at 337.
24. Indeed, Eskridge's work relies on the insight ofpublic choice and decision theory that would cast doubt on the
reasonableness of both legislators and their output. See, e.g.. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STAuTIORYINrERPRErAION, supra
note 21, at 34-38.
25. However, somewho advocate employing the standard ofthe reasonable legislatorarguethattheirmethodwould
also have positive effects on future legislative activity. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, supra note 14, at 81.
26. Such ajudge may hope that her interpretive strategies will improve the legislative process in the future, as well
as improving the law before her in the particular case. For example, Jonathan Macey's approach would not only result
in public-regarding interpretations of statutes, but it might also reduce the amount of interest group rent-seeking in the
future because the payoff for such activity would be reduced. See Macey, supra note 19. I argue, however, that the
goal of improving the political process is a secondary one for this group of interpreters. Moreover, if the process proves
resistant to the incentives these rules attempt to construct, the theoretical framework still envisions that judges will work
to improve the legislative product so that the interpretation represents the best policy.
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a strategy of interpretation that tries to implement the "best" outcome would only
improve the statute.
It would be unwise, however, for these theorists to dismiss the need for
accurate understandings of the legislative process. Certainly, all the theories have
normative and theoretical aspects that relate to empirical questions but do not depend
on them. For example, what counts as "influence" in the political process? What
characteristics must a group exhibit in order to prompt a concern about any under-
representation or inability to give voice to their concerns? But, empirical questions
are crucially implicated in any analysis. For example, is it accurate that certain racial
minorities lack influence in the political process? Are there subgroups, such as those
living in poverty, in rural areas, or in homes headed by a single parent, whose
members are denied meaningful access to the political process, while those who are
economically well-off have the same (or greater) influence as non-minorities? The
answers to such questions affect the scope of the judicial protection that should be
afforded by an interpretive strategy justified by any theory of legislative failure. If
courts miscalibrate and empower the already powerful, then greater inequity in
political outcomes may result. Or, to consider a different example, is it true that
groups representing state and local governments are ignored, outspent and systemi-
cally defeated in the federal legislative process? Such an empirical understanding
may be used to justify the clear statement rule in Gregory v. AshcroftZ; yet, it may
not accurately portray a world where theintergovernmental lobby wields considerable
political power at the national level.' Again, if the courts have miscalculated, then
strengthening the power of state and local interests may come at the cost of important
individual rights and economic reforms.
Second, notions of accountability suggest that citizens should be able to trace
the source of rules back to the entity promulgating them. An idealized vision of the
legislature acts as a justification, and in some ways as a disguise, for lawmaking by
thejudiciary. 29 Knowing the scope and nature of the divergence between the actual
and the ideal can allow us to determine more precisely which rules are judicially
constructed and which emanate primarily from thepolitical branches. Understanding
the source of rules enables the public to gauge their legitimacy and policymakers to
determine how to modify them if necessary. Furthermore, it seems possible that some
of the judicial strategies might be counterproductive in a number of ways that would
be better understood with empirical testing. If the judiciary purposely and
consistently favors one group over others in its statutory interpretation, might this
approach cause a reaction in the political branches and the state governments? Such
27. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
28. See Elizabeth Garrett, supra note 14, at 1120-31 (describing strengths and weaknesses ofintergovernmental
lobby) [hereinafter Garrett, Political Safeguards]; DAVID S. ARNOLD & JEREmIY F. PLANT, PUBLIC OFFICIAL
AssoCrATroNs AND STATE AND LOCAL GOvERNMENr A BRIDGE ACROSS ONE HUNDRED YEARS (1994) (providing
history and current status of the intergovernmental lobby).
29. See also lane J. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1, 19 (1998)
[hereinafter Common Law Originalism] (arguing that textualists, whom I have placed in the second group of
interpreters, engage in significant amounts of 'judicial lawmaking").
[Vol. 34:679
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a reaction, in the form of broadly applicable laws, might impose more costs on the
identifiable group than the burdens reduced by a few isolated court cases.
B
The second group of interpreters justify their methods in part because they offer
the possibility of improving congressional decisionmaking, which may in turn lead to
fewer laws that need to be fixed by imaginative and aggressive judicial construction.
The use of interpretive methods like textualism and rules of clear statement are best
understood as efforts to improve the quality of the decisionmaking in the politically
accountable branches." Justice Scalia succinctly explains the judiciary's role in
encouraging lawmakers to act more responsibly: "I think we have an obligation to
conduct our exegesis in a fashion which fosters that democratic process."31
Textualism and clear statement rules are designed to provide Congress with incentives
to deliberate transparently about important values, to provide satisfactory reasons for
decisions, and to set forth clearly articulated laws so that the electorate can learn and
follow then. If the legislature acts clumsily, textualists argue, judges have no choice
(and no authority) to do more than enforce the imperfect product. As I have
described it, textualists are primarily concerned with improving the conditions of
deliberation. They hope to encourage lawmakers to discuss issues fully and publicly
and to provide explanations for their decisions, whatever the substance of those
decisions might be. One might also define deliberation in a way that includes a
substantive component and requires that decisions reached by the politically
accountable branches serve a normative conception of the common good. In this
essay, I concentrate primarily on the first conception of deliberation, which is
consistent with the explicit thrust of the interpretive methods.
To return to the contract analogy, clear statement rules and textualism are
similar to information-forcing default rules because they are intended to change
30. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New"New Legal Process, 12 CARDo L.
REy. 1597, 1637 (1991) ("Textualists may want to reform Congress, getting itto focus more attention on legislating
as an entity rather than affecting the day-to-day implementation or execution of the law through fragmented centers of
power.") [hereinafter Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 457-58 (1989) (describing clear statement roles as designed to promote better
lawmaking); LAuRENCE H. TRiBE Am CAN CONSTtmoNAL LAW 383 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the use of clear
statement rule in the federalism context "can thus increase the likelihood that Congress will give full attention to the
interest of the states and those groups whose interests parallel the states"); Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill:
Congressional Findings, ConstitutionalAdjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CAsEW. REs. L. REv. 695,722
(1996) (stating that Gregory's clear statement rule "is a forthright judicial effort to influence congressional process");
William N. Eskridge, Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MIC. L. REV. 1509, 1549-50 (1998) ("Ultimately, the
new textualism might be not only democratic, but also might induce Congress to change its way of writing statutes so
that the democratic process actually works better."). Although my focus here is on the interaction between legislatures
and substantive canons, there is a similar interaction between direct democracy and the canons. Citizen-legislators are
less likely thanprofessional lawmakers to respond to incentives, but the initiative industry consists of repeatplayers who
may respond to judicial directions. See Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons,
Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. Sutv. Am. L. 477 (1997) (noting presence of such repeat players).
31. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326,346 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in thejudgment).
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behavior in the future.32 Rather than force the revelation of information, they work
to force a particular kind of public deliberation.33 They can be thought of as
deliberation-forcing or democracy-forcing. Or, to use terms that Professor Schacter
coined to describe the differences in the two kinds of approaches, these interpreters
act as disciplinarians of the political process, with the first group working to
reconstruct or complement politics.'M Examples of such disciplinarian rules include
the Gregory clear statement rule designed to protect traditional state functions from
federal intervention,35 the strong presumption against extraterritoriality,36 and the
canon requiring that Congress explicitly and clearly state its intention that States be
amenable to suit in federal court.37 By requiring a clear textual statement to
overcome the presumptions, interpreters hope to force Congress to pay close and
sustained attention to the issue and to deliberate fully before acting.
Because these interpretive methods are justified largely on the basis of their
effects on future congressional action, their legitimacy rests on predictions about
changes in congressional behavior. Scholarship providing detailed empirical studies
of current congressional behavior and the effects of similar incentive structures is
therefore necessary before we know whether the predictions are likely to be accurate.
Not only are such analyses virtually nonexistent, but the assumptions about
congressional behavior that are used in the place of data often remain unexpressed
and unexamined. Indeed, for those of us who have worked in a legislature, the
assumptions also are intuitively unconvincing, but our intuitions, based on limited
experience, need to be tested more rigorously and broadly. Virtually the only
relatively systematic empirical work with which I am familiar has been done in a
related context to determine how often and under what conditions Congress is apt to
32. Occasionally, canons ofclear statement are described as market-mimicking (like the linguistic canons described
above) because legislators would not have passed a law compromising some important constitutional value without
stating their intention clearly in the text. See, e.g., ScAuA, supra note 1, at 29:
Some of the [clear statement] rules, perhaps, can be considered merely an exaggerated statement
ofwhat normal, no thumb-on-the-scales interpretation wouldproduce anyway. Forexample, since
congressional elimination of state sovereign immunity is such an extraordinary act, one would
normally expect it to be explicitly decreed rather than offhandedly implied - so something like a
'clear statement' rule is merely normal interpretation.
However, in most cases, such rules are not defended as consistent with lawmakers' linguistic norms.
33. Again, Cass Sunstein briefly discusses this analogy in his review of Scalia's A Matter of Interpretation. See
Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, supra note 16, at 556-557 (relying on Ayres and Gertner, supra
note 16, at 97-100). He presents a more extended, but still preliminary analysis in Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism
Be Defended Empirically, (Univ. of Chicago John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 70 2d Series,
1999), at 10-16. Some contracts scholars refer to such rules as penalty defaults. This term is inappropriate in the
statutory context; a requirement of better deliberation and more transparent decisionmaking is hardly a penalty-it may
be a constitutional imperative.
34. See SchacterMetademcracy, supra note 20, at618-36; See also Schacter, Common Law Originalismsupra
note29, at9 (describing those who eschewreliance on legislativehistoryin statutory interpretation as "disciplinarians").
35. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991).
36. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, The New
Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 331,365 (1999).
37. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); see also Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law, supra note 10 (discussing and listing clear statement rules).
[Vol. 34:679
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override the Supreme Court's construction of a federal statute.38 The strong notion
of stare decisis accorded to judicial interpretation of statutes rests in part on the
argument that Congress can correct the courts' mistakes, 39 a question that demands
empirical treatment.
The absence of well-developed empirical work is even more disturbing
because similar assumptions about congressional behavior support constitutional
theories other than quasi-constitutional theories of statutory interpretation. Some
scholars of constitutional law have recently argued that Congress has an active role
to play in the formulation of constitutional norms. They envision a dialogue of sorts
between the courts and the Congress, as each reacts to the other's pronouncements. 4
This vision of interaction between the branches relies on assumptions about the
capacity of Congress to participate in such a dialogue and the methods through which
it deliberates about constitutional principles. If these theories are more than
metaphors, then their adherents need to support them with empirical analysis that
would support their predictions of congressional behavior.
In this short essay, I do not intend to provide the sort of analysis required to
assess the empirical claims of those using statutory interpretation to improve
legislative decisionmaking. Rather, this paper suggests an agenda for legal scholars
who want to break away from the court-centrism of our discipline by working to
increase the attention paid to the state and federal legislative processes. My initial
thoughts on this project follow two paths. First, I have strong doubts that the actual
legislative process can ever respond to the incentives provided by clear statement
rules and textualism to the extent that proponents of these methods seem to envision.
Second, notwithstanding those doubts, I find the notion of using incentives to improve
democratic deliberation and legislative decisions normatively appealing. It may be
that textualists and those who use judicial strategies have unrealistically high hopes,
but they are surely right that legislators could do a better job than they do now,
particularly in areas that implicate constitutional values not readily amenable to
judicial resolution. Thus, I study and advocate adopting more direct and perhaps
more productive ways to foster and improve the democratic process, such as
38. See, e.g., WiliamN. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme CourtStatutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE
LJ. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding]; Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word:
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEmn'EL. RV. 425 (1992). See also JESSICA
KORN, THEPOWER OFSEPARAION: AMEmCAN CoNSEVm~NAuISM AND TrhmMyrH oeim LEOIsLATvVEro (1996)
(studying the experience with the legislative veto).
39. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 259 (1972); see also Lawrence Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case
for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MiC-L L. REv. 177 (1989) (arguing for an absolute rule of stare
decisis in statutory cases).
40. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH L. REV. 577,653 (1993); Neal Devins
& Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REv. 83, 105-06 (1998); Michael C. Dorf,
Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV.L.REV. 4,69-70(1998). But see AbnerJ. Mikva &Jeff
Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAI.L.REv. 729-30 (1991) ("[Ihe dialectic between the Court
and Congress has represented not a healthy, respectful effort to clarify their respective obligations and objectives in a
particular area, but rather an attempt by one branch to politicize the Constitution in order to accomplish its policy
objectives."). A new theory along these lines is Neal Katyal's interesting article on advicegiving by judges. Clear
statement rules can be seen as ways to penalize legislators who do not heed judicial advice. See Neal Kumar Katyal,
Judges asAdvicegivers, 50 STAN.L.REv. 1709,1720 (1998). Again, the success of the advice depends on the capacity
of the legislators to hear it and to change their behavior.
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congressional rules that structure deliberation. These legislatively-adopted
deliberation-forcing devices could work in addition to, or instead of, the judicial
techniques that have been the primary focus of legal scholarship.
II
Other scholars have noted that the legislative process may not be capable of
responding to the incentives of textualism.41 Perhaps lawmakers cannot meet even
the demands of targeted clear statement rules that would apply in far fewer cases than
textualism, a general method of interpretation that places heavy burdens on the
drafting of all statutory mandates. Not only are there competing pressures that prod
Congress away from textual clarity and precision, but the level of congressional
awareness about relevant statutory methods and clear statement requirements may be
quite low. Empirical analysis is required to determine whether Congress fails to
respond to judicial incentives because members simply do not know about them. 41
In my conversations with legislative drafters, I find that many know that courts are
increasingly relying on the text and structure of a bill as the primary sources of
meaning, but knowledge about particular canons of construction is less widespread
and sometimes nonexistent. Similarly, a study by the Governance Institute of the
Brookings Institution found that congressional staff members were unaware of the
majority of fifteen recent statutory cases that members of the D.C. Circuit believed
warranted congressional attention.'u Furthermore, "to the extent cases are brought
to [the staff s] attention, the focus is on the court's ruling.... For instance, judicial
suggestions that 'congressional attention' be paid to some other aspect of the
statutory scheme are unlikely to be seen by committee staff." 4
Additional studies of the House and Senate Offices of Legislative Counsel,
which employ many of the professional legislative drafters, and of the lawyers who
staff the substantive congressional committees could reveal the level of congressional
cognizance of Supreme Court cases, lower court decisions, and the details of the
judiciary's methods of statutory construction. Such studies would also measure how
much legislation professional drafters prepare, and how much is written on the floor
or by personal staff, without the aid of those who are more likely to be attentive to the
41. See, e.g., Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism, supra note 30, at 1637; William N. Eskridge, Interpreting
Legislative Inaction, 87 MIaL L. REV. 67, 100 (1988) (listing obstacles even when a majority in Congress agrees on
a matter).
42. See James J. Brundley, supra note 14, at 68 ("It is unrealistic to presume that Congress or its committees are
aware of decisions, especially lower court decisions, about which they have said absolutely nothing.").
43. See also RoBERTA KA 1nd , CouRs AND CoNGRnss 73-74 (1997) [hereinaflter KAT-z mA, COUtMS AND
CONGREss]. This complaint is not a new one. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking -Judges Who
Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLtuM L. REv. 787, 794-801 (1963) (listing decisions that should have
prompted congressional reaction but that were seemingly ignored and citing as the reason "that Congressmen are too
driven to be able to attend to such matters, save occasionally, and then under the pressure of a special force").
44. Robert A. Katrnann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive
Political Theory, 80 GEo. 1.. 653, 662 (1992) [hereinafter Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gull].
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default rules and the interpretive regime. They might also illuminate how textualism
changes the influence of staff in the legislature, relative to members of Congress and
interest groups45 This concern is clearly relevant because the textualists' low regard
for legislative history stems in part from their perception that such congressional
materials are disproportionately influenced by staff, lobbyists, and interest groups.
Legal scholars have not ventured into this fertile area for study, leaving it to the
political scientists to describe congressional behavior. Thus, the scholarship lacks a
sophisticated understanding of legal decisionmaking and doctrine and cannot
adequately evaluate the relationship among the branches of government or the role
that judicial strategies of interpretation play in legislative deliberation and drafting.
Other avenues for related work concentrating on legislative actors are also
available to legal scholars. Reacting to the study of the Governance Institute
mentioned above, 6 the D.C. Circuit established a program to route certain statutory
decisions to relevant congressional committees, leaders, and legislative counsel.47 As
part of this project, scholars at the Governance Institute are monitoring the
congressional reaction to the court decisions and sponsoring seminars to improve
drafting, interpretation, and revision of statutes.' Scholars must gauge the success
of this program, understand what sorts of decisions have been forwarded and the
congressional reaction they have produced, and determine whether the initiative
should be expanded or modified.
Programs like that of the D.C. Circuit can be thought of as the equivalent of
the courts' issuing "congressional impact statements" to ensure that the relevant
legislative staff understand the effect of decisions on future legislative output.
Focusing on the other participant in this dialogue, Chief Justice Burger once proposed
that Congress be required to issue a "court impact statement" with each piece of
legislation to detail the burden placed on those interpreting the law.49 While his idea
was mostly an expression of frustration, one could imagine a rule requiring Congress
to identify in committee reports any judicial clear statement requirements that might
45. See, e.g., BernardW. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory 60-62
(1998) (unpublished manuscript) (providing preliminary thoughts on the role of staff and the need to differentiate
among different kinds of congressional staff).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
47. See KAT-MANNCOtumtsANDCoNGREsssupranote43, at76-81 (describing therathermodestproject launched
in 1992 between the D.C. Circuit and the House of Representatives); Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf, supra
note 43,662-67 (describing genesis of the project); Deanell ReeceTacha, Judges on Judging, Judges andLegislators:
Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIOST. LJ. 279,291 (1991) (also describing theGovemance Institute and itsproject).
See also RobertW. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington,A Judicious Legislator's Lexicon to the FederalJudiciary,
in JUDGES Am LEGIsLAIDtS: TOwARD INSmItrnONAL CoMY 54, 83 (R. A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (approving of a
program like the D.C. Circuit one to solve the problem of Congress' ignorance of relevant court pronouncements).
48. See KAXMANN, COuRrs AND CONGREss. supra note 43, at 78-79 (quoting the Senate legislative counsel):
Decisions transmitted have encouraged me and my staff to begin a systematic reexamination of
this Office's approach to certain legislative drafting issues. We have also entered into a joint
review of drafting issues with our House counterparts and decisions transmitted under the pilot
project will be considered in the course of that review.
49. Fred Barbash, CongressDidn't, So the Court Did,WAsPOsTNAr'LWEEKLYED.,July 15,1998, §7 at COl.
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be implicated by a particular piece of legislation."0 Similarly, Justice Ginsburg and
Professor Huber have suggested that a "second look at laws" committee be created
in Congress and that the professional drafters be explicitly charged with overseeing
matters of "statutory housekeeping."5'
Other institutions deserve to be part of this empirical analysis. In the United
States, the recently instituted Corrections Day in the House of Representatives, a
procedure to allow Congress a regular opportunity to fix statutory mistakes, could
be expanded if further analysis suggests that it could play a positive role. 2 Early
experience with Corrections Day has not been overwhelmingly positive. Instead of
passing twenty bills a month through the procedure, Congress enacted only twenty
of the Corrections Day measures in 1995 and 1996.: Most have been narrowly
targeted and designed to change regulatory decisions rather than to overturn incorrect
judicial interpretations of statutes.5' The limited impact of this innovation may result
from the procedures that surround it; for example, passage in the House requires a
three-fifths vote.55 In addition, the substantive committee with jurisdiction over the
legislation must approve any decision to place a proposal on the Corrections Day
calendar. Some have argued that the committee arguably responsible for the poor
drafting in the first place will be loathe to admit a mistake.5 7 In addition, Speaker
Gingrich cleared all Corrections Day proposals with a bipartisan review committee,
which filtered out any controversial changes.5 ' Nevertheless, further study of the
process and the hurdles reformers encountered might suggest ways to change it to
allow for broader use.
Many states also have formal mechanisms for monitoring judicial opinions
that interpret statutes, such as offices of revisors of statutes, staff counsel, and
legislative drafting and research agencies.59 For example, in Illinois, the Legislative
Reference Bureau produces an annual report of all federal and state appellate
decisions that affect the interpretation of Illinois statutes, and the Bureau has the
50. Currently, all sorts of information must accompany a committee report, including the impact on the federal
budget, the presence of any intergovernmental mandates or private sector mandates, and a regulatory impact statement
detailing any paperwork burden imposed by the law.
51. Ruth BaderGinsburg &PeterHuber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARv.L.REV. 1417 1432-23 (1987);
see also Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry ofJustice, 35 HARv. L.REv. 113 (1921); Roscoe Pound,A Ministry ofJustice:
A New Role for the Law School, 38 A.B.A. J. 637 (1952) (both proposing a Ministry of Justice to provide a line of
communication between courts and legislatures); Friendly, supra note 43, at 805-07 (proposing an agency on revision
comprising legislators, judges, lawyers and legal scholars and attached in some way to the legislature).
52. See John Copeland Nagie, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (1996).
53. See Thomas G. Donlan, Good Intentions: An Interesting Legislative Invention Produces Few Interesting
Results, BARRON'S, May 5, 1997, at 58.
54. See, e.g., Catherine Strong, Got a Law You Think Is Stupid or Unnecessary?, Assoc. Press Pl. Serv, Oct. 4,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7553804 (listing bills that had been placed on the Corrections Day calendar); Press
Release from the Speaker's Corrections Day Advisory Group, Vucanovich Says Corrections Day Provides People
with Common Sense Relief, Sept. 24, 1996 (describing two bills passed by the House overturning minor regulatory
decisions).
55. See Strong, supra note 54.
56. See Donlan, supra note 53, at 58.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in
Statutory Interpretation, 75 MiNN. L. REv. 1045, 1059-75 (1991) (detailing many of the state institutions).
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discretion to provide suggestions to the legislature for revisions. 6° Other states have
less formal mechanisms; Wisconsin has a Law Revision Committee, comprised of
state legislators, which considers judicial decisions sent to it by the Revisor of
Statutes.
61
In England, the Office of Parliamentary Counsel in the Lord Chancellor's
office is a powerful institution structured to mediate between the drafting of
legislation and the background rules used by judges to understand the legislation. As
Professor Atiyah explains:
English parliamentary counsel know and understand the way in which
English judges interpret statutes, and they draft bills in this knowledge.... Thus
it is not absurd to assume that an English act should be read in light of the canons
of interpretation; acts are designed to be interpreted in this way by the draftsman 62
Even the private bills of members of Parliament are checked by the Office to ensure
they are properly drafted. Of course, imposing such strict regimentation on
congressional drafting is unlikely. Not only must reformers work within a
government organized to meet separation of powers concerns, but United States
judges also do not employ a uniform interpretive approach and our national
legislature is much more decentralized. Nonetheless, reform suggested by the English
experience may not be entirely impossible.
Complementary legal scholarship would focus intensely on examples of
federal laws that meet judicial requirements of specificity and textual precision.
Under what conditions does congressional output appear to respond to the interpretive
regime the courts have constructed? Does the quality of the deliberation that
accompanies such laws meet our expectations? If not, does this situation lead to the
conclusion that textual clarity is a poor proxy for decisionmaking that involves public
deliberation and reason-giving? My guess is that clear statements are sometimes the
result of deliberation, but often they are not. Consider the kind of legislation that is
often phrased with excruciating precision- special interest tax breaks, transition rules
targeted to benefit only a few taxpayers, the quintessential pork barrel programs
buried in the pages of an omnibus spending bill.63 Environmental laws in the last few
years have also been precisely worded, in part because of tension between the
political branches and in part because "sophisticated, particularized, and well-funded
interests on all sides of the issues distrust [the] EPA and strive to insert favorable
language into new legislation."' In short, narrow and organized special interests may
60. See id. at 1063.
61. See id. at 1065.
62. Patrick S. Atiyah, Judicial-Legislative Relations in England, in JuoES AND LGISLAaORS: TOWARD
INsamnONA.CoffriY 129, 156 (IL A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
63. See JERRYL.MASHAw, GREED, CHAoS,ANDGOVERNANcE: UsNGPUBuCCHOICEIDIMPROVEPuBucLAw 147
(1997) ("The most specific legislation that comes out of the Congress these days is perhaps the gargantuan and mind-
numbingly detailed legislation drafted by the Budget, Appropriations, and Finance Committees.").
64. MichaelHerz, JudicialTextualism Meets CongressionalMicromanagement: A Potentlal Collision in Clean
AirAct Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVL L. REV. 175, 180 (1992).
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find it easier than other groups to meet stricter requirements, imposed either through
congressional procedures or indirectly on account of judicial decisions, and they may
be able to do so relatively stealthily.65 Statutory provisions that these groups obtain,
which are phrased so clearly and specifically that no textualist could complain, often
would not survive the scrutiny of transparent and extended legislative deliberation.
One article provides detailed case studies of the congressional response to
clear statement rules.' Carol F. Lee studied two laws passed after the Court imposed
a clear statement rule for a congressional abrogation of the states' sovereign
immunity from suits for money damages.' In both cases (the reauthorization of
Rehabilitation Act programs and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986), Congress enacted provisions abrogating sovereign immunity with
language that would pass the Court's clear statement rule. But, as Lee notes,
[gliven the substantial fiscal implications of these amendments, the most striking
feature of the legislative history is the lack of serious discussion or debate on
whether state immunity should be abrogated. Not a single member of the House
or Senate went on record in either instance to oppose the abrogation of immunity.
Indeed, not a single member of the House or Senate even asked the sponsors of the
amendments why they should be adopted or how much they would cost."'
In the case of the Rehabilitation Act, there was some discussion of the abrogation
among the administration, the primary author of the act, and some interested groups;
the Superfund provision, Lee argues, "seems to have been enacted without
congressional attention."69
Lee concludes from these studies, as well as from two others of legislation
passed in response to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,"0 that
several institutional features determine whether a clear textual statement has actually
been accompanied by deliberation.71 The complexity of the underlying legislation, the
presence of a motivated political entrepreneur, the use of appropriations riders rather
than amendments to substantive legislation, the strength of opposing interest groups,
and the timing of the legislation within the congressional term all affect the scope and
content of deliberations. The studies of statutory overrides also provide factors
65. Forarecentexample, see Thomas v.NetworkSolutions, Inc., Civ.No. 97-2412 (TFH) (D.D.C. Aug.28,1998)
(mem.) (finding aclearstatement retroactively ratifying an unconstitutionally imposed tax in ariderto an appropriations
bill added in the conference committee apparently without the knowledge of more than a few lawmakers). See also
MASHAW, supra note 63, at 72 (also noting that increased proceduralism tends to strengthen special interests that are
extraordinarily adept at using stricter requirements to block legislation they oppose); Schacter, Common Law
Originalism, supra note 29, at 44 (describing lobbyist involvement in drafting and noting the absence of systematic
empirical work on the role of lobbyists in drafting either statutory language or legislative history).
66. Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to Supreme Court
Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAw. 301 (1988).
67. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
68. Lee, supra note 66, at 329 (emphasis added).
69. Id.at331.
70. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
71. See Lee, supra note 66, at 339-40.
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worthy of increased attention, such as differences among committees in the ability to
respond to judicial incentives, the interest of the executive branch in passage, and the
configuration of interest groups."2
Congressional procedures adopted since these studies doubtlessly also affect the
ability of groups to obtain the kind of statutory language required by clear statement
rules and other interpretive techniques. For example, Congress has adopted budget
rules that require offsets be found for any revenue lost by new federal spending
programs and tax subsidies.73 These rules make it easier for Congress to overturn
judicial decisions in the tax arena which result in revenue losses for the Treasury
than it is for Congress to overturn decisions increasing taxpayers' liabilities.74 In
addition, the need for revenue estimates may also affect the way Congress drafts
legislation. In some cases, members may draft precisely to limit the effect of a federal
program to only a few beneficiaries; in others, legislators may prefer vague language
that undermines the attempts of revenue estimators to project the costs of particular
programs. In other words, the clarity of some statutory language may have more to
do with budget dynamics than with the nature of the deliberation that accompanied
enactment.
If interpreters' only interest in clear statement rules and textualism is to change
legislative output so it is more specific (perhaps for rule of law concerns or to curtail
delegations of power to executive branch agencies), then they may be unconcerned
with the way clarity is achieved. Or if the courts are using clear statement rules as
a pretext to strike down laws in a way that allows judges to appear less activist,75
they may not be concerned about the dynamics of the actual process. But proponents
of these methods justify them in part as ways to improve the legislative process and
to enhance the quality of congressional deliberation. Thus, any comprehensive
assessment of the interpretive theories requires empirical analysis of their effect on
congressional behavior.
If future legal scholarship suggests that transparent deliberation and rational
explanation are not necessarily related to textual precision - or that they are not
frequently associated with it - then the judicial methods seem less legitimate. I
suspect that empirical work will demonstrate either that Congress does not respond
to interpretive strategies as their proponents anticipate, or that the congressional
response is indeterminate. The latter finding may result from the difficulty of
72. See, e.g., Solimine & Walker, supra note 38, at 446 ("cases on taxation which can be expected to engender
intense interest group activity, are overridden" at statistically significant higher rates); id. at 449 (noting that many
overrides came from the Judiciary Committees or the Education and Labor Committees); Eskridge, Overriding, supra
note 38, at 348 (noting that state and local governments are disproportionately successful in overriding judicial
decisions); see also KAnMANN, COURts AND CONGRESS, supra note 43, at 79 (isting some of the factors relevant to
the congressional reaction to judicial decisions).
73. SeeElizabethGarrettRethinking theStructuresofDecisionmaking in the Federal BudgetProcess, 35 HARv.
J. oNLEGiS. 387,399-400(1998).
74. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative
Process, 65 U. Cm-. L. REv. 501,532-35 (1998) (discussing a specific example, congressional attempts to overturn
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988)).
75. This is one of the charges leveled by Professors Eskridge and Frickey in their analysis of clear statement rules.
See Eskridge and Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 10, at 635-36; see also Herz, supra note 64, at204.
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identifying and measuring the quality of deliberation in the political branches.
Scholars will also find that drawing conclusions from congressional silence is
challenging. When Congress does not pass a clear textual statement, have members
determined that they do not want to vary the default rule provided by the judicial
presumption, or were they merely unaware of the need for a clear statement? Did
other factors, unrelated to the transparency of the deliberation or to political
accountability, undermine congressional efforts at clarity? How can researchers
derive meaningful and accurate results from silence?
If the scholarship leads in the expected directions, the legitimacy of deliberation-
forcing judicial techniques is subject to serious question. Not only are they unlikely
to achieve their objective of improving the legislative process, but in many cases their
use will lead to a statutory interpretation precisely contrary to the intent of Congress.
For example, contrary to the default rule of Gregory, federal legislators who draft a
broadly applicable statute are likely to intend that state and local governments comply
with its mandates. Yet, application of the canon to a law without a precisely worded
statutory provision will exempt subnational governments from the law's scope. In
short, the clear statement rule will lead to a clearly erroneous result, in terms of what
the politically accountable branches have decided in a particular case, and there is no
assurance that Congress will be able to either correct this specific result or to avoid
similar erroneous interpretations in the future.
If scholars demonstrate that textualism and clear statement rules do not improve
decisionmaking in the legislative process (or that we can never know their effects),
would other methods work? Other judicial strategies are possible. For example,
judges could adopt more direct means of ensuring that Congress deliberate and give
reasons for its actions, perhaps by requiring compelling evidence of public
deliberation on particular issues that implicate constitutional values. Justice Stevens,
in Fullilove v. Klutznick, applied such an analysis in the context of minority set-
asides in a federal public works bill, thus justifying the judicial intrusion into the
deliberative process of Congress as required by the due process clause.76 This
approach could be broadly applied, with courts more regularly treating Congress as
they do administrative agencies, requiring lawmakers to provide sufficient reasons for
their decisions. 7 But such a judicial approach is, at the least, problematic. What
76. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,546-551 (1980) (Stevens, L, dissenting); see also Fallon, supra note 13,
at 86 (noting that the Court seldom uses deliberation-forcing techniques in constitutional jurisprudence, but not
considering the quasi-constitutional clear statement rules of interpretation).
77. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process ofLanmaking, 55 NEB.L. REV. 197,223 (1976):
Rational lawmaking, if we take the formula seriously, would oblige this collective body to reach
and to articulate some agreement on a desired goal.... The projections and assessments of
conditions and consequences must presumably take some account of evidence, at least in
committee sessions. Aimemberwho never attends the committee meetings should at least examine
the record of evidence before casting a vote, or be told about it, and should certainly never vote
by proxy. The committee must explain its factual and value premises to the full body.;
Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategyfor Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHu.
L. REV. 366, 367-68 (1984) ("[A] role for courts in our constitutional system might be based on the identification of
flaws in the legislative process."). Cf. Laurence Tribe, StructuralDue Process, 10 HARv.C.R.-C.L.L.REV. 269,299
(1975) (noting the possibility of an "articulated rationale" approach in due process jurisprudence, "an approach in
which challenged government action will be evaluated by the Court only in terms of purposes actually argued by the
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would count as deliberation - how public must it be, how long must the proposal be
in the public domain before action has been taken, how extensive must the discussion
be? How many members of Congress must be actively involved in the debate about
a particular bill, or a provision in a bill, before the deliberation has been sufficiently
democratic and robust?78 And is such a judicial strategy likely to prompt genuine
discussion and the articulation of reasons, or merely to elicit hypocritical justifica-
tions to mask rent-seeking by special interests and lawmakers?79 Does it matter? °
If we are uncomfortable with the notion of the judiciary intruding into the
deliberative process to this extent," another option deserves sustained and serious
scrutiny. Congress can adopt internal rules and procedures designed, in much the
same way as clear statement rules are designed to provide members a lever to force
deliberation on particular issues.' Congressionalprocedures may foster deliberation
and rationalization better than judicial doctrines. A framework that affects a
substantial amount of congressional business may be more salient to lawmakers and
the public thanjudicial pronouncements in one or a few court opinions. 3 In that way,
procedures are more direct than judicial incentives, although neither prescribes the
contours of acceptable deliberation. Moreover, the scope of many judicial decisions,
which are often explicitly limited to the particular cases the courts have decided, are
more uncertain than the reach of a comprehensive procedural framework. This
uncertainty, coupled with courts' historically inconsistent use of substantive canons
of statutory constructions and judicial disagreement about the role of textualism"5
government proponent, and not in terms of whatever purposes the Court can invent").
78. See R HARDL.HAL,PARin'IPAToNINCoNGREss21-24, 56-85, 224-25 (1996) (empirical study revealing
that only a small number of very engaged legislators are active on any particular bill and that this pattern of behavior
describes both the activity in the committees and on the floor).
79. See Linde, supra note 77, at 231 ("Articulated reasons have their place in an agency's pursuit of the goals
assigned to it. Pursued in the legislative process, the hope for candor is more likely to produce hypocrisy."); Michael
Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U.
PA. L REV. 1567,1601 (1988) ("It simply is not possible to ensure that people are public-regarding merely because
they defend or rationalize their actions on those grounds [of public-regarding verbiage].").
80. See CASS R. SuNmEv, Dadoc RcY AiM THm PROB.EM oF FREE SPEECH 243-244 (1993) (noting that the
requirement of justification "might well contribute to public-regarding outcomes. It may 'launder' preferences by
foreclosing certain arguments in the public domain.... It might even bring about a transformation in preferences and
outcomes, simply by making venal or self-regarding justifications seem off-limits."); Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of
Argument, in BARRms o CoNFtucr REsoLunO 236 (K. Arrow ed., 1995) (calling this the "civilizing force of
hypocrisy"); David Miller, Deliberative Democracy andSocial Choice, XLPOLSTmD. SFEClALISSuE54, 61 (1992)
("Preferences that are notso much immoral as narrowly self-regarding will tend tobe eliminatedby the process ofpublic
debate."); see also AMY GurMANN &DE~NS THOMPSON, DEOCRACY AND DISAGRE NT 126 (1996) (although
skeptical about ability of open debate to "transform self-interested claims into public-spirited ones," public discussion
does help "to rule out arguments that one would not accept if others made them").
81. One would imagine that those already convinced that clear statement rules are overly intrusive, see Harold L
Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety ofRequiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASEW.RES.L. REV.
731,743 (1996), would be extremely wary of this approach.
82. See, e.g., Garrett, Political Safeguards, supra note 28, at 1180-82.
83. See Schacter, Common Law Originalism supra note 29, at 51 (noting that those who refuse to use legislative
history as a strategy to change congressionalbehavior"sufferl from an exceedingly caricatured and court-centered view
of legislative history").
84. On the same day that it adopted the Gregory clear statement rule, the Court decided Chisom v. Roemer, 501
U.S. 380 (1991), which concerned an extension of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to judicial elections, but made
no mention of the clear statement rule. Perhaps the cases are distinguishable because Chisom involved national action
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and in Gregory, Congress was relying on its commerce clause power. However,
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Gregory indicates that the clear statement rule would apply in both cases. See also
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might persuade lawmakers that they could safely disregard the clear statement
requirement or the demands of textualism in a particular case. Congressional
procedures can be triggered by one member of Congress who cannot so easily be
ignored.
Fortunately, future legal scholarship can generate data and conclusions that will
begin to answer our questions about the comparative benefits of a congressional rule
structuring deliberation and a judicially imposed requirement of clear statement. For
example, lawmaking in areas that implicate federalism is affected both by judicial
clear statement rules and by a congressional framework, the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act.8" Some laws are subject to both, some to one or the other (the law at
issue in Gregory falls under the Act's second exception for a provision that prohibits
discrimination on the basis of age), and perhaps a few to neither. Analysis of these
laws.will allow us an opportunity to compare the effects of the judicial and legislative
approaches and to identify any interactions between them, as well as to determine
which, if either, actually improves the democratic process in ways that enhance
political accountability.
Other congressional structures adopted in recent years also promise to be fertile
subjects for legal scholars. Congressional proposals to reduce spending for small,
narrowly targeted federal programs, which many believe are more likely to be private-
regarding than to be public-regarding, have included requirements that such
provisions be widely publicized and be tied clearly to the sponsoring lawmaker."
Similarly, reducing the ability of Congress to act through omnibus legislation88 -
something along the lines of single subject rules or more rigorous germaneness
requirements - might do more to improve congressional deliberation than would
textualism. Many states have rules imposing similar structures on legislative
Schacter, Common Law Originalism, supra note 29, at52 (noting that many techniques of statutory interpretation are
used by judges in a way that is "hardly predictable in any clear or precise way").
85. Justice Scalia overstated the acceptance of textualism in his dissent when he wrote:
I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language in a statute:
first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and second, using established
canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning
other than the ordinary one applies.
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,403 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
87. See, e.g., Guidelines to be Followed by the Chairman in Considering Targeted Transition Rules, July 18,
1988 (issued by Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee) (responding to a series of negative press
reports about so-called "rifleshot" provisions, i.e., provisions "to protect specific taxpayers, transaictions, or projects from
a change in the law," by requiring that they be added in open mark-up sessions and that sponsors and beneficiaries be
clearly identified); Lawrence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation
Constitutional?, 44 TAx L. REv. 563, 567 (1989) (describing the reaction of the Ways and Means Committee);
Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20
CARDozo L. REv. -, Part IV (forthcoming 1998) (discussing rifleshot policy and similar effect of provisions of the
federal Line Item Veto Act).
88. SeeJlot B.Gam RRECNcILABLEDERENcEs?CoNGREssmTBuDnPRocEssANmDDEcrr8-81
(1990) (noting that the number of bills has declined in the past four decades while the number of pages of laws enacted
has increased substantially, providing data, and concluding that the data support the notion that Congress is now
working more through omnibus bills than in the past).
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deliberation, which would provide useful comparisons for study. 9 The scholarly
agenda for those of us who study the legislative process is a full one, and it may force
the law schools to abandon not only their court-centrism, but also their federal-
centrism. The latter shift is increasingly important as more responsibility is
"devolved" to state and city officials and as direct democracy shapes more economic
and social policies.9
Legal scholarship that draws on the disciplines of political science,
philosophy, and economics, as well as traditional legal doctrine, has begun to address
some of the questions I have raised in this essay. Additional detailed empirical and
theoretical work is required to assess the deliberation-forcing justifications for
textualism and clear statement rules and the assumptions about the legislative process
on which they are based. It must be broadened to include the study of congressional
structures that directly shape lawmaking as well as judicial deliberation-forcing
methods. Not only must scholars work to understand whether such congressional
rules better meet the democratic aspirations of the judicial techniques, but we must
also determine when Congress is likely to adopt such rules and how they are best
structured.91 In this essay, I have focused on one small comer of the study of the
legislative process. The study of legislation raises a multitude of questions for legal
scholars whose work will identify and answer questions of institutional design,
electoral structures, congressional rules, the interaction between the legislative and
executivebranches, theinterplay amongfederal, state, andlocal governments, and the
relationship between direct democracy and representative legislatures.
Legal scholarship on the legislative process and the role of the political
branches in the constitutional structure will build on the work of scholars like Bernard
Schwartz, whose careful study of constitutional law, administrative law, and legal
institutions has influenced legal scholars and practitioners. And, such work will
respond to a goal of legal scholarship of which Judge Edwards approves, but does not
extend past lawyers' role in the courtroom: "to be of value to the law it is essential
that the work in question express interest in, and respect for, the possibilities of what
lawyers and judges do."'  In this age of legislation, scholarship that enhances our
89. See generally, RICHARD BRIFFAULT, BALANCING Ams: THE REALnTY BEHIND STATE BALANCED BUDGEr
Amem (1996) (studying state balanced budget requirements to gain insight into the possible effects of a federal
requirement); WilliamD. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 541 (1988)
(discussing state constitutional provisions designed to encourage legislative deliberation).
90. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 Tax L. REV. (forthcoming
1999) (arguing that state initiatives shape the agenda at the federal level as well as affect state and local policies).
91. For a thoughtful analysis ofsome ofthe inherent limitations in empirical work in this are, see Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation, Empiricism, and the Closure Problem, 66 U. CH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
92. Edwards, Another Postscript, supra note 7, at 563 (quoting James Boyd White, Law Teachers' Writing, 91
BIC. L REV. 1970, 1976 (1993)).
1999]
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understanding of the legislative process plays an indispensable role in what modem
lawyers, judges, and law professors do.
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